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INTRODUCTION

James Fanto, Lawrence Solan, and John Darley build their
article, Justifying Board Diversity,' on the basis of two essential

claims-one legal, the other empirical. The legal claim is that existing
law does not much constrain how corporate boards address the (lack
of) diversity of their membership.2 The empirical claim is that board
diversity doesn't increase shareholder value. 3 Based on these two
claims, Fanto et al. criticize "diversity advocates" for making the
fundamental mistake of justifying increased board diversity on the
grounds of increasing shareholder value. What's worse, this strategy
does not reflect diversity advocates' true values, which are about
social justice, not financial self-interest. This is what I call their
mismatch critique.

The legal and empirical claims are unobjectionable, and for
purposes of this Commentary, I will assume that they are correct.
However, the mismatch critique warrants careful unpacking. The
@ 2011 Jerry Kang.
Professor of Law, Professor of Asian American Studies (by courtesy), Korea TimesHankook Ilbo Chair in Korean American Studies, UCLA; kang@law.ucla.edu,
http://jerrykang.net. Thanks to Jonathan Feingold for able research assistance.
1. James A. Fanto, Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Justifying Board
Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 901 (2011).
2. See id. at 920-28.
3. See id. at 917-20.
*
**
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strength of this critique turns on whether diversity advocates had or
have better options realistically available to them. The authors make
modest attempts to suggest a few, but none is systematically
defended. In the end, their alternative suggestions are implausible or
underspecified, which undermines the force of their mismatch
critique.
I. Two CLAIMS AND A CRITIQUE

Legal claim. Fanto et al. point out that for all practical purposes,
corporate boards have great flexibility on whether to take proactive
action to increase racial and gender diversity within their ranks.' On
the one hand, they can choose to do nothing at all and leave their
membership predominantly white and male.' Constitutional lawe.g., the federal Equal Protection Clause-has no say because
corporations are not state actors. Title VII has no say because board
members are not "employees" within the meaning of the statute. On
the other hand, boards can opt to take proactive action. Corporate
law doesn't constrain them much, given the large error bars placed
around board decision making courtesy of the business judgment rule,
even if short-term profits are arguably sacrificed.' Moreover, as
already discussed, equality law under the Constitution and Title VII
doesn't apply. So, angry white males don't have a legal leg to stand on
either.
Given this legal flexibility, diversity advocates have pushed their
agenda of increasing board diversity. But they have not done so
through fiery recollections of the 1960s civil rights movement; instead,
they have opted for the rhetoric of corporate self-interest ("the
business case for diversity"), as measured by shareholder value.'
Empirical claim. Unfortunately, this tactic runs smack into
inconvenient facts. As Fanto et al. summarize, there is no empirical
demonstration that board diversity actually improves shareholder
value. 9 As they point out, such evidence would be startling because
the structure of boards generally has been found to be irrelevant to
shareholder value.10
4. See id. at 918-19.
5. See id. at 926.
6. See id. at 920. The authors add that even if Title VII did apply, disparate
treatment and impact cases would be difficult to win. See id. at 926.
7. See id. at 918-19.
8. See id. at 917.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 918.
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This leaves diversity advocates in a pickle, caused by the
empirical fragility of their argument. Their case is built on an
empirical assumption that cannot be demonstrated. So they lose.
Further, Fanto et al. seem to blame diversity advocates for taking this
path." They suggest that diversity advocates should have done
something else, more consistent with their true values and
motivations grounded in social justice. 12 To repeat, this is their
mismatch critique.
II. UNPACKING THE MISMATCH CRITIQUE
A.

The "Mismatch"

According to Fanto et al., diversity advocates are driven by "X"
but deploy an unrelated set of arguments, "Y." The authors are clear
about what "Y" is: the business case for diversity, as measured by
shareholder value. They are somewhat less clear about what "X" is,
but it has something to do with social justice. The most direct
statement is here:
We believe that the advocates' concern about board
diversity is primarily motivated by ...

social values that

undergird the Civil Rights Act. This motivation would
seemingly render the arguments about the business advantage
of diverse boards irrelevant. For if those who support
diversifying corporate boards do so because they believe
diversity to be a worthy value in its own right, then the
arguments about whether diversification enriches shareholders
would seem to be a necessary intellectual justification, but not
one of significant concern.14
Although somewhat vague, the "social values" of the Civil Rights
Act probably appeal to the ideals of corrective justice, distributive
justice, and antidiscrimination. In any event, the authors' point is that
diversity advocates don't really care about corporate self-interest.

11. See id. at 904.
12. See id. at 904-05.
13. See, e.g., id. at 917 ("[P]roponents of board diversity often feel obligated to justify
it on the basis of shareholder value.").
14. Id. at 921. It seems odd to focus so much on the Civil Rights Act when there are
other sources of equality-related values, such as the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover,
I'm doubtful that including board memberships formally in the purview of Title VII would
satisfy diversity advocates because, as Fanto et al. themselves point out, winning a Title
VII case would be ridiculously hard.
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Thus, we have a mismatch. Diversity advocates are driven by social
justice ("X") but talk instead only of corporate self-interest ("Y").
B.

The "Critique"

Fanto et al. don't explicitly argue that mismatch is intrinsically
problematic-in terms of, say, insincerity and artifice. Instead, their
critique seems to be that diversity advocates bet on the wrong horse
("shareholder value")." Put in more strident terms than the authors
deploy, diversity advocates "sold out" 6 by embracing the business
case for diversity, and now the chickens are coming home to roost. To
mix one last metaphor, diversity advocates made their bed (no doubt
with nice, corporate-embroidered duvet covers), and they now have
to lie in it.

The force of this critique depends largely on whether diversity
advocates could have done otherwise. Assuming that they were
indeed driven by various "justice" goals and motivations, could they
have offered a different rhetorical strategy and/or substantive
justifications that would have worked better and were less empirically
fragile? Fanto et al. say that diversity advocates "may not want to pin
all of their hopes"" on one set of empirical results." But if no better
option was and is on the table, then the criticism seems quixotic. So,
what are the alternative options? What are the other "justifications
and normative frameworks ... to support diverse boards"19 that
Fanto et al. suggest?
C.

The Alternatives?

1. Fighting Groupthink?
Fanto et al. chafe at how finance theory has colonized corporate
law, governance, and policymaking.20 Rejecting this orientation, they
15. See id. at 904-05.
16. One is reminded of Audre Lorde's observation: "[T]he master's tools will never
dismantle the master's house." AUDRE LORDE, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle
the Master's House, in SISTER OUTSIDER 110, 112 (1984). The point is eloquently made,
but I think it's a substantial exaggeration. Tools designed for one purpose often can be
used for contrary ends.
17. Fanto et al., supranote 1, at 902.
18. See id. at 904 ("We argue that diversity advocates should embrace justifications
and normative frameworks other than shareholder value to support diverse boards."); id.
at 919 ("Why, then, cannot diversity advocates be content with winning the diversity war
without winning the empirical battle?").
19. Id. at 904.
20. See id. at 904-05.
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argue that even if shareholder value can't be demonstrated, perhaps
board diversity could be justified on the grounds of improved decision
making, especially in pathological cases.2' In particular, they suggest
that greater diversity could decrease "groupthink"22 (even if such
decreases could not be picked up in shareholder value regression).
But almost immediately, Fanto et al. point out that as an
empirical matter, it's heroic to assume that increased board diversity
of the sort we are likely to see would have much impact on
groupthink. 23 First, there is a selection bias. The only kinds of women
and minorities that would be let onto boards would have been vetted
so as not to rock the boat too much.24 Second, a critical mass is
necessary to change deliberative dynamics, not just one or two
"outsider" board members. 25 As The Who put it succinctly: "Meet the
new boss, same as the old boss." 26 In the end, the groupthink
justification also falls prey to its empirical fragility and cannot be
easily proven.27
In addition, this kind of justification-even if empirically
demonstrable-would not ameliorate the "mismatch" part of the
mismatch critique. Improving board decision making, for example, to
check excessive manager compensation, is still fundamentally about
promoting corporate self-interest and not about social justice.
2. Social Justice?
So, what realistic option do the authors prefer? To repeat, it
can't be about shareholder value, grounded in finance theory. That
only "belittles or cheapens the case for board diversity." 28 It's hard to
pinpoint concrete alternatives, but the authors do repeatedly refer to
other "normative frameworks." One example they offer is "to redress
past discrimination." 29 They also recommend "signaling effect,"30
21. See id. at 928.
22. See id. at 913 (describing the conformity pressures triggered through
"groupthink"). The authors help explain groupthink with "social identity" research. See id.
at 914-15.
23. See id. at 928-29.
24. See id. at 929.
25. See id. at 929-30.
26. THE WHO, Won't Get Fooled Again, on WHO'S NEXT (MCA Records 1971).
27. See Fanto et al., supra note 1, at 930 (describing any change in board social
identity as "difficult to achieve").
28. Id.
29. Id. The full quotation reads:
In addition, it is clear that the case for board diversity, as for diversity in other
contexts, is based upon normative frameworks other than shareholder value (e.g.,
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which is more a mechanism than a rhetoric or substantive
justification. The point here would be to signal to "employees,
customers, and the community that the firm is inclusive" and "signal
the firm's compliance with the norms embodied in antidiscrimination
laws."'
These sorts of justifications 2 have the benefit of avoiding any
mismatch: they squarely raise the justice point. But, as the authors
explicitly recognize, these arguments probably won't persuade board
members much.33 It's not as if diversity advocates don't already touch
on themes of justice and fairness in making their case. But when push
comes to shove, diversity advocates are skeptical that justice-based
arguments will succeed in the boardroom. That is why they've gone
after corporate self-interest. If they can at least make the business
case plausible (even if not definitive), then through motivated
reasoning and interest-convergence, perhaps boards might diversify
themselves just a bit. And realistically, do diversity advocates ever
expect anything more than incrementalism on this front?
CONCLUSION
For those who have studied diversity in the educational context,
this conversation is familiar. 34 Diversity advocates in the college
context pushed for affirmative action for social justice reasons that
were continuous with ending de jure racial segregation. But the
Supreme Court constrained the sorts of arguments that could be
cognizable and focused narrowly on the pedagogical value of

to redress past discrimination).... In our view, diversity advocates in the corporate
context should base their advocacy upon these frameworks, just as the frameworks
inspire antidiscrimination laws.
Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 931.
31. Id.
32. A few other justifications are noted in passing: minorities and women might
tolerate discrimination less; they could serve as role models; and they might have a
symbolic value. See id. at 934. All three appear in two sentences just before the conclusion.
33. See id. at 904 ("[Diversity] advocates may feel compelled to make their arguments
within this perspective of shareholder value because they understand it to be shared by
public company board members, including members who are women and ethnic and racial
minorities."); id. at 919 ("[Diversity advocates] no doubt realize that there are probably
limits to how far generalized business justifications, which have no unassailable empirical
support in shareholder value, will take them in financial and investment circles.").
34. For an insightful comparison of diversity discourse deployed in educational versus
corporate contexts, see generally Sung Hui Kim, The Diversity Double Standard, 89 N.C.
L. REv. 945 (2011).
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diversity.35 Accordingly, diversity advocates shifted tactics and
focused on proving up that pedagogical case,36 which incidentally has
had greater empirical support 37 than the shareholder value claim.
What's interesting is that commentators have warned against
embracing the pedagogical justification for diversity-that such a
rhetoric and justification was mismatched to the goal of promoting
civil rights."
As in that debate, the most important question is whether
diversity advocates could and should have done otherwise, and what
realistic alternatives are on the table. In civil rights work, there are
always excruciating tradeoffs between transparent signaling of values
versus close-to-the-vest, poll-tested framings; short-term versus longterm gains; standing your ground versus co-optation; winning the
battle but losing the war; principle and pragmatism. In some ways,
Fanto et al.'s analysis struggles through these very themes. But, in my
view, too much remains submerged under the surface, without
explicit articulation and defense of how and why they would make
different and better trade-offs than the so-called "diversity
advocates."
This Commentary is a critique of the Fanto et al. article, and it
has remained faithful to the task of analyzing carefully their argument
and performing an internal analysis. It has not, as some comments
and reviews do, used the work as merely a springboard to opine on
largely unrelated issues. If I were to give myself a little more leeway,
I'd suggest an alternative-which can only be sketched out here.
Besides shareholder value and groupthink, I'd emphasize more
antidiscrimination by leveraging social scientific findings that discuss

35. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306-09 (1978) (rejecting
past societal discrimination as a compelling interest).
36. See Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action:
Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 677 (2004)
("[A]ffirmative action is increasingly being justified not as a remedy to historical
discrimination and inequality, but as an instrumentally rational strategy used to achieve
the positive effects of racial and gender diversity in modem society.").
37. See COMPELLING INTEREST: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON RACIAL
DYNAMICS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 131 (Mitchell J. Chang et al. eds., 2003) (analyzing

the individual, institutional, and societal benefits of diversity in higher education and
arguing that "[t]he most abundant research evidence supporting arguments for the
continued use of affirmative action in college admissions exists in the area of how
individuals benefit from diversity") (emphasis added).
38. See Gabriel J. Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity, 4 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 881, 930 (1996) (suggesting that for some advocates of affirmative
action "the diversity fig leaf exists as a pretext").
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both structural impediments and implicit biases.39 Many board
members may not feel that it's their duty to take proactive action to
counter structural problems that may throttle the number of racial
minority and female board candidates. But many will feel obligated
not to treat two people with identical merit (even traditionally
defined) differently because of their social categories.' And that is
what the implicit bias science now strongly suggests.4' In other words,
to increase board diversity, one could remind board members that
they might be engaging unintentionally in "discrimination now"42 and
that they should check themselves and adopt what Mahzarin Banaji
and I have called "fair measures." 43
The larger strategy could look something like this. Diversity
advocates should frame rhetorically the task as one of basic justice
and fairness. They would add that increasing diversity doesn't hurt
the bottom line (this is the weaker version of the business case for
diversity)." And that even though all the board members are, of
course, fair-and-square, implicit biases may be coloring their
evaluations of candidates, at least on the margins. Thus, the board
should adopt fair measures with an eye toward increasing board
diversity. I assume that this approach would be a friendly amendment
to the strategy recommended by Fanto et al. Indeed, they might think
it to be merely a restatement. If so, we are all on the same page.
This overall strategy could make some incremental benefits to
board diversity. It may be dissatisfying to many diversity advocates.
Frankly, it should be. But again, for those who labor for social justice,
the question has always been: "As compared to what?"

39. For an introduction to the science, see Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1497-1535 (2005); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through
Colorblindness:Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 473-90 (2010).
40. See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin Banaji, FairMeasures: A Behavioral Realist Revision
of "Affirmative Action," 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1082-86 (2006).
41. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit
Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALTY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 17, 19-20, 32 (2009) (completing a meta-analysis of 122 research reports,
involving 14,900 subjects, that revealed predictive validity of the Implicit Association Test
in domains including intergroup interactions).
42. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 40, at 1067-76.
43. See id. at 1066-67 (describing the use of "fair measures" in contrast to "affirmative
action").
44. The authors fully realize this: "[D]iversity advocates do not need a failsafe
empirical case for the benefits of board diversity in order to promote their cause; they just
need to make persuasive, business-related arguments and have them adopted in board
circles." Fanto et al., supra note 1, at 919.

